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Abstract. This article describes some theoretical and methodological concerns with the approach of the 
United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) towards establishing the validity of the 
counterintelligence-scope polygraph (CSP). 
 
US Public Law 100-180 authorizes the DOD CSP Program in the effort to deter and detect activity 
involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism taken to harm US security interests. To this end, CSP 
examinations are conducted on military personnel, DOD civilian employees, and DOD contractor 
personnel. For example, according to the DOD Polygraph Program Annual Polygraph Report to Congress 
for Fiscal Year 2000, 7,890 underwent a CSP examination. Of these, 7,688 were judged non-deceptive 
based on physiological indices and provided no substantive information to the contrary (suggesting the 
potential of security-inappropriate behavior), while 202 were judged otherwise and/or provided 
substantive information suggesting the potential of security-inappropriate behavior. Of the latter 202, 
194 received a favorable adjudication, 3 are still pending adjudication, 5 are pending investigation, and 
no one received adverse action denying or withholding access to classified or sensitive information. And 
of the 202, 11 provided substantive information suggesting the potential of security-inappropriate 
behavior but continued to be judged as deceptive based on physiological indices. 
 
What to make of the above data? One conclusion might be that no one needed to be examined in Fiscal 
Year 2000, because no one experienced a change in security status. Another might be that 8 might 
eventually require a change in security status. In this latter case, one might require a policy 
determination of whether identifying 8 or less security-vulnerable individuals is worth the expenditure 
of money, personnel, time, and materiel necessary to conduct 7,890 examinations. Yet another might be 
that at least 3 of the 202 received a favorable adjudication even though physiological indices continued 
to suggest deception--a conclusion that seems to cast a question on the whole notion of what the 
physiological indices of deception denote. 
 
The conclusion that common physiological measures of the CSP bear on deception is based on several 
data sources. First, some individuals who tell the truth or lie on the CSP do look the way they should 
look on the physiological measures. However, there are significant false positives and negatives that 
detract from the investigative utility of this finding. Moreover, as the social context within which the 
examination occurs approaches the reality of an actual counterintelligence one, the actual pattern of 
true and false positive and negatives becomes more and more unknowable. In this regard, the anecdotal 
information provided by the Report that describes individually compelling cases of CSP examinees who 
were forthcoming about substantive information is not helpful to address this matter. 
 
Second, some individuals in interludes before an imminent examination or during an examination--but 
before allegedly significant physiological indices of deception appear--do indeed "spill the beans" about 
security-inappropriate behavior. This finding, of course, does not bear on the validity of the physiological 
indices but on the social psychological phenomenon of the "bogus pipeline." 
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Third, perseverative recitations of the CSP's validity by individuals whose own political and material 
power as well as professional reputation are dependent on beliefs in this validity often serve to 
reinforce the very conclusion of the CSP's validity. Yet between belief and Truth there can be disparity. 
 
Fourth, there are perseverative recitations of the CSP's validity by others who believe it would be 
contrary to the security interests of the US to assert otherwise--regardless of the CSP's validity. 
Ironically, those must dedicated to US strength may be most weakening it. 
 
Yet the CSP continues make up over 70% of the overall DOD Polygraph Program. This is the case, even 
though the US Government's own data supporting the validity the Test for Espionage and Sabotage 
(TES)--the primary CSP examination--are extremely tenuous. However, instead of going back to the 
drawing board to assess how the reductionist approach of physiological indices suggesting complex 
social psychological phenomena makes epistemological sense, DOD is marching on with ever more 
esoteric research projects and contracts intended to link physiological measures such as 
electroencephalographic, magnetoencephalographic, novel electrodermal, laser-doppler vibrometric, 
"Vericatric" (voice-based), and infrared thermal imaging data directly to deception or indirectly through 
something called psycholophysiological "stress." 
 
Although recent efforts to increase consistency of polygraphic technique and requirements for 
continuing education of polygraph examiners are positive steps, the notion that the emperor may be 
wearing no clothes may not be deceptive or must at least await its final adjudication. (See Department 
of Defense Polygraph Program Annual Polygraph Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2000. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/dod-2000.htn; Honts, C.R. (1992). Counterintelligence 
Scope Polygraph (CSP) test found to be poor discriminator. Forensic Reports, 5, 215-218; Honts, C.R. 
(1991). The emperor's new clothese: Application of polygraph tests in the American workplace. Forensic 
Reports, 4, 91-116; Iacono, W.G., & Lykken, D.T. (1997). The validity of the lie detector: Two surveys of 
scientific opinion. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 426-433; Saxe, L., & Ben Shakhar, G. (1999). 
Admissibility of polygraph tests: The application of scientific standards post-Daubert. Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, 5, 203-223; Terpstra, D.E., Kethley, R.B., Foley, R.T., & Limpaphayom, W. (2000). The 
nature of litigation surrounding five screening devices. Public Personnel Management, 29, 43-54.) 
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